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Abstract 
 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to identify the political, institutional and economic 
obstacles to achieving economic integration and stability in the euro area while finding a 
solution to those obstacles by examining the economics and political dynamics of the 
currency union. The benchmarks of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact encouraged cosmetic reforms that did little to alter the structural problems of the 
Eurozone‘s economic periphery. Therefore, the best political and economic solution to 
the problem of integration is to allow for fiscal federalism within the union whereby 
Member States take full ownership of their economic policies. Although decentralizing 
fiscal policy is an essential part of fostering integration, harmonizing banking regulation 
throughout the Eurozone is also necessary course of action.  
The guarantee of emergency funds for Eurozone states at the precipice of default 
will only breed a moral hazard for more rule-breaking. The conditionality of tough 
austerity measures of the emergency programs also breeds popular animosity against the 
euro and outsources the moral and political responsibility of unpopular structural reform 
to forces outside of the country. Member States should allow heavily indebted states to 
default and allow banks that made investments in those countries‘ debts to incur losses. 
Through enforcement of the no-bailout clauses of Eurozone agreements, domestic 
 
 
political actors will be unable to issue more debt and thus have the political cover to 
impose the necessary structural reforms to improve the economic sustainability of their 
respective countries. Since an exit from the currency union would aggravate the debt 
problems of a peripheral Member State, the rest of the euro area is unlikely to suffer the 
loss of membership by refusing to transfer funds to its insolvent members. 
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Introduction:  
 
 European Monetary Union (EMU) symbolized another step towards European 
integration and away from the political and economic divergences that plagued the 
continent for many centuries. Although political motivations were responsible for making 
the framework a reality, potential economic benefits contributed to the desire for 
monetary union as well. The institutional weaknesses of the arrangement were not 
apparent at the beginning, but revealed themselves in the aftermath of the first global 
economic crisis since the establishment of the euro. The economic fissures afflicting the 
union are a consequence of distorted national economic policy structures that 
compromised the fiscal positions of the Eurozone periphery. Their difficulties are also a 
result of the credibility gap that was endemic in the treaties of the monetary union. In 
order to maintain the economic integrity of the Eurozone, several countries will have to 
undergo significant changes in their deeply imbedded socioeconomic structures or suffer 
the consequences of crippling debt, high unemployment, and stagnant economic growth. 
 To ensure the integration and economic health of the common currency, the 
project of monetary union in Europe evolved through several stages. In 1991, the 
European Community agreed to undergo three steps towards the formation of economic 
integration. The first was completing an internal market through the free movement of 
labor, goods, services and capital. The second was the Maastricht criteria for 
convergence, and the final stage was European Monetary Union (EMU), which was 
supplemented by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Barrell, Ray 1992).  
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During the Maastricht and the SGP periods, Member States seemed to have made 
progress toward achieving fiscal stability and sustainability. In recent years, however, 
some of those countries have backslidden into precarious economic circumstances and 
have compromised the viability of the union. That development led observers to examine 
some of the deficiencies of the economic rules and guidelines of the Eurozone. The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the political, institutional and economic obstacles to 
achieving economic integration and stability in the euro area while finding some solution 
to those obstacles by analyzing the economics and political dynamics of EMU. 
Although the purpose for establishing EMU was mainly political, the creation of 
rules to maintain the economic integrity of the union put pressure on the traditional 
monetary and fiscal models of some of the Member States. On the surface, the Maastricht 
Treaty and the SGP produced a degree of interstate economic convergence that Europe 
had never seen. Nevertheless, the causal link between those agreements and fiscal 
contraction in the euro area remains a source of debate. There is little doubt that the 
agreements were unable to prevent the current crisis and are no longer regarded as 
blueprints for resolving it. 
The four entry requirements of the Maastricht Treaty (Section 109J) were that 
Member States needed to have converging inflation rates that matched the rates of the 
three members with the lowest rates, nominal exchange rates had to remain stable, 
nominal exchange rates had to converge, and deficits could not exceed 3% of GDP. The 
final requirement, however, allowed for significant discretion. ―Article 104c(a) states that 
a deficit might not be considered excessive if it has ‗declined substantially and 
continuously reached a level that comes close to the reference value‖ (Eichengreen, Barry 
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J. 1995). That ambiguous caveat allowed for states with traditionally high deficits to 
finagle their way into the monetary union.  
In order to enforce compliance with economic benchmarks, the SGP consisted of 
a preventative and a corrective measure that Member States were beholden to. The 
preventative arm of the Pact took the form of multilateral budgetary surveillance, while 
the corrective arm allowed the Council to instruct Member States to meet the 3% of GDP 
deficit threshold or incur financial sanctions instead (Heipertz, Martin and Verdun 115). 
Nevertheless, the council never imposed any corrective measures because the more 
influential members of the Eurozone manipulated the process to avoid sanctions they 
would have incurred.  
This thesis will go on to argue that the best possible sanction for fiscal 
irresponsibility exists within the forces of markets—not institutions. If governments are 
irresponsible or enact policies that are economically unsustainable, market forces respond 
by divesting from their private and public sectors. The painful market-based 
consequences of bad economic policy deliver more appropriate and efficient signals for 
domestic political actors and voters that large multinational bureaucratic institutions may 
be unable to deliver. The most immediate way to allow markets to function as a 
correction on bad economic policy is through de-institutionalization of fiscal rules and 
maintaining national sovereignty of fiscal policy. This thesis thoroughly endorses 
reducing bureaucratization of the currency union and recommends abolishing the hard 
economic benchmarks of the SGP.  Loose policy guidelines in a more federalist 
economic arrangement are a much more desirable replacement for the strict 
conditionality of the SGP. In spite of the necessity for fiscal federalism, there is a greater 
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likelihood that the failure of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP will lead to more 
centralization and increasing economic supervision within the Eurozone. Furthermore, 
transfers of funds or common Eurobonds will only create a moral hazard that will likely 
lead to future economic mismanagement. 
Even though the Maastricht Criteria and SGP sought to strengthen and stabilize 
the different economies of the Eurozone, they did little to change the legislative 
environment for genuine reform of government spending. Consequently, few structural 
changes emerged as a direct result of the Maastricht criteria or the SGP. In addition, 
problems in Spain and Ireland would reveal that the economic benchmarks of those 
treaties were deficient and unable to foresee the difficulties that high current account 
deficits could create.  
The Eurozone currently faces tremendous hardship as a consequence of the 2008 
financial crisis. The global recession revealed institutional weaknesses in the common 
currency and has cast doubt on its economic viability. As a result, several countries are at 
the precipice of defaulting on their excessive debt burdens. A seemingly obvious 
consequence of the debt crisis in Europe was the loss of credibility the SGP suffered. 
Events leading up to the sovereign debt crisis, however, were already signaling that the 
SGP never stood on solid ground. Furthermore, much analysis has shown that not only 
were the Maastricht Criteria and SGP lacking institutional credibility, they may have 
even served to work against their purported goal of economic integration and stability 
within the currency union.  
The majority of the literature dedicated to the economic crisis in the Eurozone 
sympathizes with the idea that increasing centralization at the European level would 
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provide the appropriate environment for economic convergence and stability. However, 
that assumption tends to ignore the possibility that centralizing the economic norms of 
the currency union through the SGP and Maastricht Treaty may have been the culprit for 
the Eurozone‘s inability to achieve full economic integration. Although the idea of 
increasing supervision and control over a group of heterogeneous economies is 
psychologically comforting, excessive conditionality tends to encourage cosmetic 
reforms for the sake of compliance, which consequently distorts the incentives of 
economic policy makers.  
The most likely way for the Eurozone to achieve fiscal stability and convergence 
is to allow for fiscal federalism by softening the rules of the SGP and allowing the 
corrective forces of the market (e.g. high interest rates on sovereign bonds) to provoke an 
endogenous political will necessary to alter the flawed economic structures of the euro 
area‘s bad economic actors. The disaster that would ensue as a result from exiting the 
currency union should dissuade any heavily indebted Member State from leaving the euro 
area. As a result, Eurozone members have sufficient political capital to refuse bailouts 
and allow for the default of Member States if necessary.  
The Eurozone core is reticent to allow for default because their banks hold much 
of the bad debt that peripheral countries accumulated and are struggling to pay. If the 
peripheral Member States default on their obligations, the losses banks would incur could 
pose a systemic risk to the core economies of the Eurozone. The fear of contagion, 
however, overlooks the fact that recent stress tests found most banks would be solvent in 
the event of an economic crisis and are continuing to accumulate more cash in reserve 
(European Banking Authority 2011). Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly apparent 
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that a Greek default is certain. Delaying that inevitability would probably do more harm 
than default through debt restructuring. 
 
 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy: 
 
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the European Central Bank (ECB) gained full 
authority over monetary policy and the responsibility to maintain price stability in the 
Eurozone. To meet those requirements, the Treaty ensured the independence of the 
monetary authority from political pressures by policy makers. The Treaty prohibited 
monetization of public deficits and ―[safeguarded] institutional, personal, functional and 
financial independence of the ECB‘s decision-making bodies‖ (Torres, Francisco S. 
2006). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, restrictive monetary policy allowed Germany to 
maintain lower inflation rates than its European neighbors. Upon adopting German style 
monetary policy, price level increases in Europe began converging from 1985 onwards 
(Scheremet, Wolfgang 2000). 
Along with the political salience of Germany‘s restrictive monetary policy came 
an uncertainty about the economic circumstances of the soon to be members of the euro 
area. While Germany enjoyed low inflation rates and relatively stable fiscal policies, 
many other prospective members did not share the economic discipline of Europe‘s 
strongest economy. As a result, there were strong political and economic incentives for 
Germany to avoid entering an arrangement that could adversely affect its economy. That 
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concern led German policy makers to become the architects of the treaties and 
institutions within the currency union. 
The Barro-Gordon model explained that when a high inflation country and a low 
inflation country enter into a monetary union, the high inflation country could gain a 
better reputation by virtue of association with the lower inflation country. Another 
possibility the Barro-Gordon model accepted was that that the country with lower 
inflation could have its reputation suffer as a result of being in a currency union with a 
high inflation country. In order to mitigate the reputational losses from such an 
association, the country with lower inflation would decide to impose various conditions 
before joining a monetary union. The Barro-Gordon model illustrated the dynamic behind 
Germany‘s insistence on economic conditionality prior to adoption of the euro (de 
Grauwe, Paul 1996).  
As a result of imposing disinflationary policies on potential members of the 
currency union, ―a temporary increase in the unemployment rate will be inevitable (a 
movement along the short-term Phillips curve)‖1 (de Grauwe, Paul 1996). Furthermore, 
the willingness of a country to endure some pain in order to meet convergence criteria 
does not guarantee future disinflationary policies. By virtue of their earlier disinflationary 
policies, the Greek or Portuguese ECB representatives may choose to encourage more 
inflationary policies at some point in the future. That uncertainty led de Grauwe (1996) to 
conclude that using convergence on inflation as a condition for membership was possibly 
harmful. Countries with higher amounts of debt may have a greater incentive to create 
―surprise inflation‖ as a means of maximizing employment and fostering economic 
                                                          
1
 The theory that there is an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment. 
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growth. De Grauwe (1996) concluded that reducing debt to GDP prior to adopting the 
euro was a more constructive condition than convergence on inflation.  
 De Grauwe (1996) claimed that the Maastricht criteria made convergence more 
difficult for the weaker economies of the Eurozone. The inflation requirement created 
difficulties towards meeting the debt requirement because if a Member State‘s 
disinflationary policies lack credibility, it would become difficult to lower inflation 
expectations, which would keep nominal interest rates high. However, as inflation goes 
down and nominal interest rates remain high, real interest rates increase, which would 
also increase the real value of the debt (de Graue 1996). The main implication of that 
phenomenon is that true convergence on public debt and deficits is probably more likely 
in the absence of convergence criteria.  
De Grauwe (1996) found that allowing membership into the Eurozone without 
imposing Maastricht Criteria would facilitate the ability for Member States to meet the 
budget deficit norm of the Maastricht Treaty. His solution for that paradox was to put 
more emphasis on the ECB‘s responsibility to maintain price stability instead of the 
bureaucratic imposition of economic conditionality. Strengthening of euro area‘s 
monetary institutions is more influential in creating monetary stability than imposing 
convergence requirements (de Grauwe, Paul 1996). Gros (1995) also suggested removing 
fiscally irresponsible countries from the decision making apparatus of the ECB, which 
would assuage any concern about some countries negatively influencing monetary policy 
in the Eurozone. 
The fiscal limitations of the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent SGP also applied 
pressure on the viability of the European social welfare model. In 1997, Member States 
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agreed to apply a loose coordination of social welfare policy outlined in the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) (Attia, Nicole 2007). Boeri (2002) discussed the merits of 
harmonizing social policy in the Eurozone and concluded that de-centralization was 
likely to be more preferable than transnational harmonization because ―local provision of 
social security can better exploit local information and deal with the large informational 
asymmetries jeopardising the effectiveness of redistributive policies.‖ Boeri (2002) did 
concede, however, that there were potential benefits to soft coordination on policies, such 
as establishing common standards ―to estimate the debt of public pension systems, 
[developing] social policy expenditure projections and [providing] general accounts 
which can best isolate the various (often improper) functions played by public pension in 
the EU countries.‖  
Neo-Keynesian
2
 critics derided the budget constraints the Maastricht criteria and 
the SGP imposed on national governments because of the difficulty it created in using 
countercyclical fiscal policies as a method of stabilizing national economies. 
Nevertheless, Gali and Perotti (2003) found that Eurozone countries had more procyclical 
fiscal policies prior to ratification of Maastricht. They also observed that the decline in 
total government investment in the economy within the euro area mirrored trends in 
industrialized countries around the world. Furthermore, that trend was underway before 
the ratification of the Maastricht criteria. In light of Gali and Perotti‘s findings, neither 
the Maastricht Treaty nor the SGP seemed to be responsible for the reductions in 
government expenditures throughout the euro area. However, Gali and Perotti (2003) 
                                                          
2
 Economic theory developed by British economist, John Maynard Keynes, explaining that government 
spending stimulates economic activity and mitigates the hardships that arise as a result of recession or 
depression. A major feature of Keynesian economic policy is ―counter-cyclical‖ government spending. For 
example, during an economic downturn, government purchases should go up, while taxes should go down 
and during periods of economic growth, government spending should go down, while taxes go up.  
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admitted that there were no major recessions during the sample period they studied, so 
they conceded that different circumstances could have changed the results of their study.  
Attia and Bereger (2007) found that there indeed was ―a process of conditional 
convergence‖ within the euro area and that the Maastricht criteria curbed the rate of 
growth on social expenditures. However, their study did not account for trends in the 
developed world that seemed to mirror those in the Eurozone, making it unclear as to 
whether the Maastricht Treaty was responsible for contraction in social welfare 
expenditures. 
Unlike Gali and Perotti (2003), Fatás and Mihov (2009) found that fiscal policy in 
the euro area actually became more procyclical during the Maastricht period. They did 
agree, however, that the SGP did little to influence fiscal policy. They also argued that 
since monetary union created a distinct risk of asymmetric shock
3
, the goal of fiscal 
synchronization outlined in the SGP made it difficult to utilize different national fiscal 
policy responses in the event of such a shock. As a result, homogenization of economic 
policy increased the risk of asymmetric shock within the monetary union (Fatás, Antonio 
and Mihov 2009).  
Blavoukos and Pogoulatos (2008) explained that the Maastricht criteria imposed 
―hard conditionality,‖ whereas the adoption of the SGP after the establishment of the 
Eurozone was a much softer form of conditionality because the acceding countries 
already achieved their goal of membership in the euro area. Exogenous constraints (―push 
factors‖) did little to ensure fiscal sustainability, whereas endogenous pressures (―pull 
factors‖) created the environment for enacting necessary structural reforms toward 
                                                          
3
 An asymmetric shock is when there ―is a sudden and dramatic drop in investment demand in an EU 
country which does not, however, affect the aggregate demand of the other countries‖ (Di Gennaro, Luca 
2005). 
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establishing fiscal sustainability. When reforms were perceived to be imposed externally, 
domestic support was weak and thus created the risk of future compliance issues. 
Although exogenous influences may insulate political leaders from electoral pressures, 
they also create an environment for shallow reforms. In their study of the four southern 
European states: Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal (SE-4), they found that much of the fiscal 
adjustment that occurred during the Maastricht era did not survive long after adoption of 
the euro. 
The Maastricht criteria‘s emphasis on fiscal ―consolidation‖ instead of fiscal 
―sustainability‖ allowed for a ―[reliance] on macroeconomic policy reform without the 
need to engage in substantial structural reforms that involved much higher political cost 
for the incumbent government‖ (Blavoukos, Spyros and Pogoulatos 2008). The more 
substantive structural reforms would have involved more politically sensitive issues 
―such as transfers, subsidies and government wages‖ (Blavoukos, Spyros and Pogoulatos 
2008).  If the will to address such politically delicate issues comes exogenously, the 
likelihood of backsliding increases (Blavoukos, Spyros and Pogoulatos 2008).  
Blavoukos and Pogoulatos (2008) explained that accounting for ―quality of 
adjustment‖ as a benchmark of conditionality policy would have been much more 
effective than the imposition of numerical targets. The evidence of the fiscal crises within 
the euro area shows that the Blavoukos and Pogoulatos (2008) recommendation would 
have fared much better. Higher quality structural reforms also tend to be politically risky. 
It is possible that the reward of entry into the Eurozone could have muted any political 
fallout that would have ensued otherwise. Nevertheless, imposing drastic structural 
reforms after adopting the euro may be politically difficult considering that leaders can 
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no longer use the reward of Eurozone membership as a justification for their policies. In 
addition to the fact that many Member States had structurally unstable economies, their 
prospective economic troubles came to pose a risk to the stronger economies within the 
monetary union as well. The main cause of contagion was that banks throughout the 
Eurozone held and continue to hold the sovereign debt of the peripheral countries. 
Therefore, missed or delayed payments created the threat of a major banking crisis in the 
Eurozone core. 
Kenen (2000) explained that the costs of one country‘s default would shift to 
other countries within a monetary union. Membership in a common currency may lead 
governments ―to neglect the side-effects of their own fiscal policies and borrow more 
than they would if they were made to internalize the full effects of their policies‖ (Kenen, 
Peter B. 2000). In order for the Eurozone to survive the economic indiscipline of Member 
States, it must allow them to suffer the consequences of their policies without 
intervening. As Blavoukos and Pogoulatos (2008) explained, external pressures provide 
insufficient motivation to sufficiently alter domestic economic policies. 
Hallerberg and Bridwell (2008) argued ―that the effects of the Stability and 
Growth Pact have been asymmetric‖ and that the structure of the government influences 
the effect of fiscal rules on a given country. The SGP ―serves a useful function in fiscal 
contract states, where it reinforces the domestic fiscal institutions based on fiscal targets. 
It has no real effect, however, on delegation states. Such states were more likely to have 
excessive deficits and to ignore explicit Commission recommendations‖ (Hallerberg, 
Mark, and Bridwell 85). In a delegation state, political actors delegate decision making 
responsibilities to a high ranking bureaucrat (e.g. finance minister) in what is usually a 
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government with single party control. A contract state, however, relies on coalitions to 
build fiscal contracts. In the contract system, ministers ―effectively become managers of 
ministries that already have their spending mandates predetermined‖ (Hallerberg, Mark 
and Bridwell, 75). 
They also found that larger states tended to have higher deficits and were less 
likely to comply with European Commission recommendations. Nevertheless, they 
concluded that all euro area states increased their fiscal discipline to varying degrees 
since 1999. Hallerberg and Bridwell (2008) argued that the perception of fiscal 
recklessness is a product of Member States being unable to live up to the high standards 
of the SGP rather than a result of genuine backsliding. As this thesis will show, however, 
some states lacked sufficient fiscal discipline to prevent their debt crises from 
materializing. Subsequent information will also reveal that even the core economies of 
the Eurozone also had issues complying with the fiscal rules they imposed.  
Hallerberg and Bridwell (2008) found that Member States reached fiscal 
convergence in the years following the Maastricht Treaty, but they also observed a 
―clustered divergence in fiscal policy outcomes‖ in which there was a certain group of 
states that was able to maintain or achieve fiscal stabilization and another group that was 
not. Although convergence may have been achieved on a larger scale, significant 
differences persisted from country to country. The SGP emerged in order to assuage 
concerns about the credibility of Article 103
4
 of the Maastricht Treaty, but it ultimately 
did little to prevent the sovereign debt crisis.  
In spite of the fact that the no-bailout clause of Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) was an important trait of the Eurozone‘s structure, its credibility 
                                                          
4
 No-bailout clause 
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was also in doubt. The 2010 transfers
5
 to Greece to help service its debt responsibilities 
confirmed those doubts. Even though the TFEU prevented Member States from assuming 
the debt of other Member States and prevented the ECB from directly monetizing any 
sovereign debt, it never specifically banned the practice of low interest cash 
transfers/loans from one Member State to the other (Paliouras, Vaileios). Nevertheless, 
the transfers effectively undermined the spirit of the no-bailout clause. Explicit violation 
of the no-bailout clause came later when the ECB initiated sovereign debt purchases 
throughout the economic periphery of the Eurozone (Sapir, Andre, Pisani-Ferry and 
Darvas 2011). 
In light of the sovereign debt crisis, the establishment of a European level 
institution in charge of banking supervision and regulation became a more realistic 
possibility. Prior to the crisis, Member States opposed the idea because ―it would amount 
to the pooling of risks associated with bank failures‖ (Sapir, Andre, Pisani-Ferry, and 
Darvas 2011). However, the financial crisis showed ―that the absence of such institutions 
imposes an even bigger burden sharing on countries, especially within the euro area 
where the ECB has been made to act as the lender of last resort to banks that may turn out 
to be insolvent‖ (Sapir, Andre, Pisani-Ferry, and Darvas 2011). 
 Although fiscal federalism is essential for the economic success of EMU, 
regulatory imbalances throughout the union created catastrophic distortions that led to 
excessive lending and an eventual systemic risk in some Member States. As a result, this 
thesis accepts the premise that some degree of European level banking regulation is 
necessary in order to avoid the excesses that led to the debt crises in some peripheral 
Member States.  
                                                          
5
 In the form of low interest loans 
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The Politics of EMU:  
 
 Gabel (1999) examined the dynamics of public support for EMU among EU 
citizens and found that poorer citizens who depended on cash transfers from the 
government were less likely to support EMU. Workers who were employed in more trade 
sensitive sectors of the economy were also less likely to support monetary union as well. 
On the other hand, residents of border areas were more likely to endorse the idea than 
people who lived inland. Moreover, ―as the value of cross-border shopping increases, the 
margin increases by which border resident more strongly prefer EMU than non-border 
residents‖ (Gabel, Matthew J. 1999). There was no correlation between public sector 
worker sentiment and their country‘s public debt as a percentage of GDP. Generally, 
respondents were more likely to support EMU if their country had higher debt levels, 
higher levels of inflation, and longer period of membership in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), which preceded EMU (Gabel, Matthew J. 1999). The results showed 
that citizens of Member States made nuanced economic considerations prior to forming 
their opinions on the common currency. 
 Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) found that European voters‘ opinions on EMU 
were more sensitive to certain economic indicators, ―such as inflation, unemployment, 
and trade, but not on the relative independence of their country‘s institutions of central 
banking.‖ Respondents from countries that had higher levels of inflation were more likely 
to support EMU because they perceived the arrangement as a check on inflation. In 
addition, countries that had higher levels of unemployment also tended to be more 
supportive of EMU. Respondents from countries that traded more with European partners 
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were also more likely to support a common currency. Like Gabel (1999), Kaltenthaler 
and Anderson (2001) found that countries belonging to European institutions for longer 
periods were more likely to support EMU as well. Overall, Kaltenthaler and Anderson 
(2001) found that people who had a stronger sense of national identity were opposed to 
joining the euro area, while individuals with more utilitarian economic interests were 
more supportive of the common currency (Kaltenthaler, Karl C. and Anderson 2001). 
Knoester and Kolodziejak (1992) maintained that the Maastricht convergence 
criteria were inadequate because they never emphasized supply-side economic policies as 
a method of reducing debt. Instead, Maastricht allowed for tax increases to cover for 
massive public sector spending as a more politically expedient route toward reducing 
deficits and debt. Nevertheless, Kenen (2000) observed, ―that a monetary union may raise 
factor mobility, especially capital mobility, which would make it harder for national 
governments to impose taxes necessary to avoid large budget deficits‖ (Kenen, Peter B. 
2000). Consequently, EMU put greater pressure on countries to curb spending instead of 
pursuing revenue increases through taxation—even though the generous European social 
welfare model applied political pressure on countries to maintain spending on the social 
safety net. The implication is that while political and economic realities keep 
governments from imposing higher taxes, there are political pressures to maintain the 
welfare state as well.  
High spending and insufficient revenue was an especially distinctive feature of 
the Greek economy. The reason Greece had the lowest level of tax revenue in EU was 
because the tax code was progressive to the point of encouraging individuals to become 
self-employed in order to underreport their earnings. Self-employed individuals paid a 
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much smaller share of taxes into the social security system, but enjoyed the benefits of 
the social safety net while incurring few of the costs. Under the Greek tax structure, high 
middle income earners incurred much higher tax rates than middle to lower-middle 
income earners. In a system where more than half of wage earners pay no income taxes, 
the political cost of undoing the excessive progressiveness of the tax system would be too 
high (Mitsopoulos, Michael and Pelagidis 2011). 
The reticence to reform the fiscal structure of a country out of fear of political 
reprisal illustrates the negative policy biases
6
 regarding fiscal policy. Conversely, 
political leaders have positive policy biases that adversely affect a government‘s fiscal 
position as well. The most salient positive policy bias exists in the desire to increase 
government spending during election years in order to artificially and temporarily 
maintain or increase social welfare benefits. This form of fiscal activism is one of the 
more distinctive features of economic policymaking in democratic countries. 
Afonso (2005) collected data on government expenditures in the run-up to 
parliamentary elections during the period from 1970 to 2003
7
 and found that government 
underwent noticeable expansion during election seasons. Mink and Haan (2006) also 
discovered that, on average, budget deficits increased by .96% of GDP during the runups 
to elections. Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) also found strong evidence of a political 
budget cycle in the euro area that amounted to a fiscal expansion of about 1.4% of GDP 
on an average election year (Golinelli, Roberto and Momigliano 2006).  
                                                          
6
 ―Negative‖ policy biases arise from political pressures that create a bias towards inaction, while ―positive‖ 
policy biases arise from political pressures that create a bias towards some kind of legislative action. 
7
 Portugal and Spain did not have democratic elections until 1975 and 1977 respectively (Afonso, Antonio 
2008) 
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The ideological composition of the government also influenced the amount of 
spending during an election year. Left leaning governments were more likely to embrace 
Keynesian fiscal expansion and greater social expenditures. Mink and Haan (2006) added 
that the motivation to curb spending might have been greater for prospective Eurozone 
countries prior to adoption of the euro. Upon gaining entry into the euro area, however, 
the SGP may not have had the same coercive power as the Maastricht Treaty. They 
surmised that fiscal contractions leading up to adoption of the euro provided more 
flexibility to engage in less disciplined fiscal policy after adopting the euro (Mink, Mark 
and Haan 2006). 
The 1993 European Commission White Paper called, ―Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment‖ stressed the importance of controlling unemployment as the ―center of 
political attention‖ (Frieden, Jeffry A., Gros and Jones 1998). The paper went on to state 
that European competitiveness would come at the cost of maintaining a munificent 
welfare state within Europe. By 1994, the ―Reflection Paper‖ published by the German 
Christian Democrats emphasized the fact that few countries were actually qualified to 
enter EMU (Frieden, Jeffry A., Gros and Jones 1998). The election of Jacques Chirac in 
1995, who ran on a platform of helping ―the unemployed and socially excluded,‖ called 
into question any fiscally disciplined measures toward achieving convergence (Frieden, 
Jeffry A., Gros and Jones 1998). Nevertheless, the exchange rate crises of 1995 
illustrated the need for stability, and Jacques Chirac agreed to the tighter fiscal criteria 
proposed by German Finance Minister and author of the SGP, Theo Waigel. However, 
―in response to a tightening of fiscal reform measures, France erupted in a series of 
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strikes against the government‘s policy and, by extension, against EMU‖ (Frieden, Jeffry 
A., Gros and Jones 1998).  
Protests in France are evidence of the political difficulties related to fiscal 
consolidation. Outside forces ultimately forced French leaders to reform their fiscal 
policy and it suffered public legitimacy issues as a result. Excessive bureaucratization at 
the European level will do nothing to assuage disenchanted voters who have yet to feel 
the pain of their country‘s fiscal mismanagement. Furthermore, transnational regimes that 
transfer funds (on a conditional basis) to Member States in crisis reduce the likelihood of 
popular support for domestic reform. 
Although the purpose of the IMF is to resolve the problems that afflict several 
euro area countries, there remains a strong motivation to solve the fiscal crises without 
the help from non-EMU sources. Bofinger and Ried (2010) observed that ―the strongest 
argument is a feeling of European federalism that would be violated once the IMF 
interferes: since the IMF is not called when California has liquidity problems, it should 
not be called when Greece does either‖ (Bofinger, Peter and Ried 2010). However, they 
subsequently admitted that the comparison to US states was not completely analogous. 
Apart from the moral hazard that the IMF creates by virtue of its existence, its 
role as a safety net for the euro area undermines the spirit of the no-bailout clauses. 
Having a guarantor of debt at any level creates the possibility for free riding within the 
Eurozone despite the fact that there may be no framework in the arrangement that allows 
for a bailout. Therefore, a Member State may continue reckless fiscal policy within the 
euro area because it has a safety net outside of the currency union. New rules within the 
monetary union should prevent countries from seeking support outside of the 
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arrangement in order to truly prevent future cases of economic free-riding. Violation of 
fiscal rules, however, is not a policy that is excusive to the smaller economies of the 
Eurozone.  
Chang (2005) explained that the size of a country was a strong determinant of its 
economic interests and its corresponding policies. Larger economies have an easier time 
running counter-cyclical policies than smaller economies, which makes the SGP much 
more burdensome for those smaller economies. In addition, the structure of EMU assigns 
greater voting weight to larger countries in the Council of Ministers, which means that 
there are possible political costs associated with voting against the larger countries as 
well. Chang (2005) also found that large countries are also less likely to incur 
reputational costs for breaking rules than small countries (Chang, Michele 2005). 
Buti (2004) claimed that as soon as 2002, the SGP started unraveling as fewer 
members of the Eurozone adhered to the rules. By 2002 Germany and Portugal (and later, 
France) had deficits exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold of the SGP (See figures 1.1. and 
1.2). According to SGP regulations, they should have incurred disciplinary action, but 
―When the Commission recommended this course in November 2003, the Council 
demurred by suspending decisions on whether the next stage of sanctions should be 
imposed on France and Germany‖ (Buti, Marco 2004).  
Larger Member States are better equipped to ―manipulate the rules due to 
institutional structures that give more voting weight to large states and norms that have 
made [France and Germany] the leading voices for monetary integration for decades‖ 
(Chang, Michele 2005). In 2005, German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder sought to 
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reform the SGP by adding certain qualitative exceptions to its budgetary constraints. He 
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wanted the SGP to consider ―quality of expenditures‖ to prevent any possible sanctions 
Germany would incur as a result of violating SGP fiscal rules. Schroeder was able to get 
the concession he wanted by ―[offsetting] reunification costs at 4 percentof GDP a year‖ 
(Chang, Michele 2005). The violation and subsequent manipulation of fiscal benchmarks 
by the core economies of the Eurozone perpetuated an environment of economic 
mismanagement in the periphery and revealed that a reliance of standards through 
transnational bureaucracies allows more influential members to ignore the rules without 
fear of reprisal. 
 
 
Sovereign Bond Spreads in the Eurozone: 
 
In light of the problems that emerged from the credit crisis of 2007, ―financial 
markets were gripped by a ‗flight to risk‘‖ in which the perception of risk was low and 
investors flocked to assets that were traditionally less safe. Rating agencies perpetuated 
the flight to risk by illicitly assigning top ratings for assets that did not merit them. As a 
result of the crisis in the financial system in 2008, markets reacted with a ―flight to 
safety‖, which had ―profound implications for the workings of the government bond 
markets in the Eurozone‖ (de Grauwe, Paul 2009). Markets flocked to traditionally safe 
assets such as US, French, and German sovereign bonds, which lowered their interest 
rates relative to other, less robust economies (de Grauwe, Paul 2009). While sovereign 
bond yields were going down in the stronger economies, they were rising in the weaker 
ones (See figures 2.1 and 2.2). 
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In the year since the financial crisis of 2008, interest rates on sovereign bonds of 
Greek, Portuguese and Irish debt increased dramatically. Apart from imposing fiscal 
inflexibility, high interest rates on sovereign debt create negative externalities, because 
rescuing banks in countries with higher bond yields makes subsequent bailouts of banks 
more expensive than they would otherwise be. Consequently, ―This is likely to lead to 
further weakening of economic activity in these countries with possible feedback again 
on the banking system, on the government budget deficits and on the ratings applied by 
the rating agencies‖ (de Grauwe, Paul 2009). 
In order to eliminate the adverse effects of sovereign bond yield differentials in 
the euro area, de Grauwe and Moesen (2009) recommended issuing ―euro denominated 
bonds that would be guaranteed collectively by the governments of the Eurozone‖ (de 
Grauwe, Paul 2009). The interest rate on the common Eurobond would simply be the 
weighted average of the yields of every Member State at the time of the purchase. The 
common Eurobond would allow Germany to continue to benefit from its low borrowing 
costs, but  also allow the weaker economies of the euro area to have easier access to 
capital without imposing burdens on any other Member States (de Grauwe, Paul and 
Moesen 2009). They explained that an advantage of issuing such bonds is that countries 
that now face higher yields would have an easier time financing their stimulus programs.  
An elegant version of the Eurobond is the Weizsacker and Delpla (2010) Blue 
Bond proposal. They recommended pooling up to 60% national debt to GDP of all 
Eurozone countries, which would reduce the interest rate on sovereign bonds. Member 
States would have to repay the Blue Bonds in full before repaying any additional debt—
Red Bonds—that it would issue once it borrowed over the 60% of GDP threshold. In the 
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event of a Red bond issuance, ―sound procedures for an orderly default‖ would be in 
place as well (Weizsäcker, Jakob von and Delpla 2011). The fact that the Red Bonds are 
not collective, must be repaid after Blue debt, and have a procedure for default 
accompanying them would lead investors to ask for exorbitant interest rates on those 
debts. The flight to safety dynamic brought investors to place more of their money in 
lower risk sovereign bonds, such as Germany‘s, which brought down average bond yields 
throughout the euro area. Therefore, debt amalgamation would lower borrowing costs for 
smaller and less liquid Member States and facilitate the use of fiscal policy as a means of 
stabilization (Weizsäcker, Jakob von and Delpla 2011). 
In a later defense of the Blue Bond proposal, Weizsacker and Delpla (2011) 
explained that one of the benefits of combining Eurozone debt through Blue Bonds could 
be the emergence of the euro as an alternative to the dollar as a world reserve currency. If 
the euro becomes a reserve currency on par with the dollar, then demand for the euro 
could reduce borrowing costs even further and possibly converge at levels lower than 
Germany‘s. An additional benefit of the proposal is that the Red Bonds would make 
borrowing so expensive that it would dissuade any additional borrowing on top of the 
60% of GDP threshold. It would ―[complement] the Stability and Growth Pact rules.‖ 
Weizsacker and Delpla (2011) proposed that the Red bonds ―should be largely kept out of 
the banking system so that Red Bonds could plausibly form the basis for the planned 
orderly default mechanism in the euro area.‖ The ECB would not be able to monetize any 
Red debt. A mechanism for an orderly default is a much better alternative to the ad hoc 
and seemingly dysfunctional procedures the Eurozone has engaged in to address the 
sovereign debt crisis. The Red Bond structure would remove the incentive for banks to 
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purchase sovereign debt above the 60% of GDP threshold that they had been willing to 
finance leading up to the debt crisis. 
The problem with the Blue Bond proposal is that there is always a possibility that 
political pressures would make leaders increase the borrowing threshold of the Blue Bond 
in times of crisis. Retorting that ―the independent stability council would assure that no 
Blue Bond allocations are ever put to vote in national parliament beyond the 60 percent 
limit according to its statutes‖ is insufficient because it assumes that the independent 
stability council would have the political will to maintain the borrowing limit once a 
country reaches debt at 60% of GDP (Weizsäcker, Jakob von and Delpla 2011). The 
proposal seems to lean on the same assumption framers of the SGP relied on in its no-
bailout clause; primarily the idea that leaders would stand firm in defense of the rules and 
be willing stomach the economic (and political) pain that would come as a result. Of all 
the Eurobond proposals, however, the Blue Bond does make an effort to reinforce the 
integrity of the SGP and provide some kind of orderly default, which is currently lacking 
in the euro area. 
The problem with any kind Eurobond is that it amounts to little more than 
treatment for a symptom. The causes of excessive debts are the diverging macroeconomic 
structures of the Eurozone periphery. High bond spreads within the union are a reflection 
of those problems and a common Eurobond would only mask those problems 
temporarily. De Grauwe and Moesen (2009) also admitted that the common Eurobond 
would create a free-riding phenomenon whereby southern European states and Ireland 
would have less incentive ―to conduct sustainable fiscal policies. As a result, the 
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countries with low spreads, and especially Germany, may have to bail out the 
governments of these countries in case of default‖ (de Grauwe, Paul and Moesen 2009). 
Although a common Eurobond would reduce sovereign bond spreads, rule 
violations would persist under such a framework as well. Kosters (2009) observed that 
the common Eurobond ignored the no-bailout clause of Article 103 and created such a 
moral hazard that ―from now on every other EMU member state could also count on such 
a bail-out if it could threaten bankruptcy‖ (Kosters, Wim 2009). Kosters added that high 
deficit and high inflation states that entered monetary union never believed the no-bailout 
clause was a credible feature of the monetary union because ―State bankruptcy of an 
EMU member was not considered very probable since it would have negative effects not 
only on the country in question but also on the other members as well as on the euro‖ 
(Kosters, Wim 2009). 
There are also several practical issues pertaining to the implementation of the 
common Eurobond. One of those problems is that the common Eurobond yield could 
converge at the rate closer to the country with higher sovereign bond rates than the ones 
with the lower rates ―because common Eurobonds are structured products presently 
mistrusted‖ (Kosters, Wim 2009). Bond yields for sound euro economies may go even 
higher if bond purchasers fear that stronger euro states would have to shoulder the burden 
of an eventual bailout of the weaker Eurozone countries regardless. There may be 
political impediments to the Eurobond as well. Voters in stronger euro area economies 
may become more hostile to the concept of a common Eurobond because it would 
essentially ask German, French and Dutch tax payers to shoulder a higher price for their 
country‘s borrowing in order to support the spending habits of other members.  
28 
 
Issing (2009) insisted that the best way to combat high bond spreads within the 
Eurozone was simply for weaker economies to become more fiscally responsible. He 
explained that the existence of the euro denominated bond ―would foster the illusion that 
it is possible for a country to get out of difficulty without having undertaken fundamental 
reforms‖ (Issing, Otmar 2009). Furthermore, Kosters (2009) welcomed bankruptcy over a 
bailout or common Eurobond because bankruptcy facilitated long-term stability. He 
explained that a false sense of solidarity within the euro area provided the ―incentive for 
lack of discipline, destroying EMU in the long run‖ (Kosters, Wim 2009).  
The common Eurobond would be a bad idea for all of the reasons Issing (2009) 
and Kosters (2009) explained. It is a more subtle form of mutual support, which would 
perpetuate the same kind of moral hazard that would arise from an institution 
guaranteeing a bailout in times of financial distress. Furthermore, the Eurobond would 
hide the necessary signals that a high sovereign bond interest rate delivers. A high 
interest rate forces governments to alter their fiscal policy in order to avoid economic 
ruin. Along with a credible no-bailout clause, high interest rates provide the perfect 
disincentive for fiscal irresponsibility. The Blue Bond proposal is admittedly the best 
Eurobond proposal and the only one that directly attempts to rectify the credibility gap 
endemic in prior agreements, but it rests on the defunct assumption that European 
institutions will uphold their rules when faced with politically sensitive ultimatums. 
From its inception, rule breaking was a recurring phenomenon within the EMU 
framework. Greece gained admission after its government deliberately forged 
convergence criteria numbers. Along with other Eurozone members, Greece continued 
fixing its economic data through ―creative accounting‖ practices, such as underreporting 
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military expenditures, overstating social security surpluses, ―off balance sheet borrowing 
by guaranteeing obligations of state-owned enterprises, interest rate swaps that reduce 
current borrowing costs by transferring the additional burden to the future or hiring 
private banks to construct deficit-hiding devices‖ (Paliouras, Vaileios). Furthermore, 
Germany and France sought to prevent an early warning and an excessive deficit 
procedure against them after they exceeded the 3% deficit-to-GDP limit. Ultimately, they 
avoided the fines by changing the rules of the SGP in their favor (Kosters, Wim 2009). In 
fact, the larger European economies had issues complying with SGP requirements long 
before the debt crisis surfaced in the Eurozone periphery 
Although the ―Suspension of the excessive deficit procedure against Germany and 
France, [may have signaled] the amputation of the dissuasive arm of the Pact,‖ the 
preventative arm was losing credibility as well, ―as evidenced by persistent negative gaps 
between fiscal projections and the outcomes of successive rounds of stability 
programmes‖ (Buti, Marco 2004). Buti (2004) blamed the three largest Eurozone 
countries ―for the credibility gap affecting stability programmes, as their fiscal 
projections can be shown to suffer a significant bias to under-predict actual deficits.‖ The 
inability to adhere to the Eurozone rules was a widespread phenomenon. Establishing 
rescue mechanisms to reconcile the reputational damage of rule-breaking will only 
perpetuate future compliance issues. 
Eurozone institutions should not operate to assuage the fears of economically 
inefficient and irresponsible countries within the currency union. The best way to 
maintain economic and institutional integrity of the euro area is to enforce its no-bailout 
clause and expand it to prevent Member States from using institutions outside of the 
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arrangement. Fixed numerical benchmarks and fiscal rules do not bring convergence or 
economic sustainability. Therefore looser and broader policy prescriptions allowing for 
fiscal federalism—along with the establishment of common accounting standards—
should replace the regime of rigid economic goals. 
 
 
Wages and Labor: 
 
Differences in labor markets create circumstances in which national economies 
respond to monetary policy in different ways, which is why a symmetric shock may still 
have asymmetric effects. A shock to a group of countries may require different monetary 
policy prescriptions in different countries (Gros, Daniel 2003). In his simulation, 
Tamborini (2006) found that the more asymmetric the shock the Eurozone endures, the 
less capable the ECB would be in stabilizing it. The likelihood then becomes that 
―smaller idiosyncratic countries‖ will be left alone to resolve the effects of such a shock 
(Tamborini, Roberto 150). Although Viñals and Jimeno (1998) argued that symmetric 
shocks were much more likely in EMU, asymmetric shocks remained a possibility. They 
explained that the mechanisms to mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks are labor 
mobility, fiscal policy and relative wage flexibility. Unfortunately, labor mobility is an 
unlikely solution ―since the numerous historical, cultural, and linguistic differences 
across European countries constitute a formidable barrier to international migration‖ 
(Viñals, Jose and Jimeno 39). In addition, the ―Maastricht Treaty grants only a limited 
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role to national fiscal policies to cushion the impact of real asymmetric shocks‖ (Viñals, 
Jose and Jimeno 39). 
Wage rigidity
8
 also makes withstanding the effects of asymmetric shock more 
difficult because ―structural rigidities in national labor markets make wages respond 
slowly to worsening economic conditions. Real wage rigidity describes the extent to 
which unemployment rises as a consequence of inadequate wage adjustment to a real 
shock‖ (Scheremet, Wolfgang 2000). Wages need to be flexible enough to go down 
during recession in order for firms to add to or maintain their labor force. If wages remain 
overly rigid, natural unemployment will remain high. In fact, many European states 
continue to struggle with unemployment (See figures 3.1 and 3.2). In order for Member 
States to withstand the effects of asymmetric shocks, they must undo some of the policies 
that have been traditionally favorable to unions and allow more wage flexibility to 
control unemployment. Viñals and Jimeno (1998) concluded that EMU would not 
aggravate the problems Europe already faces with unemployment, but the limited degree 
of labor mobility and fiscal policy solutions would make it very difficult for ―countries 
with differentiated economic structures‖ to deal with asymmetric shocks (Viñals, Jose 
and Jimeno 41).  
Wage policy within EMU is one of the major challenges to Eurozone 
convergence. Scheremet (2000) concluded that convergence of inflation rates within the 
euro area could not mask the differences in wage policy setting among states  
 
                                                          
8
 The inability for wages to adjust according to changes in national output. In order to maintain the same 
levels of employment, wages should adjust downward as output/GDP goes down. Wage rigidity is usually 
an effect of union negotiated salaries that remain at high levels as a result of binding collective bargaining 
agreements. 
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participating in EMU. He also observed that there was large variance in wage formation 
processes among EU member states. ―This concerns not so much the level of wage 
bargaining (i.e., the company, industry, or national level) as the organizational forms of 
the unions (i.e., industry, professional or politically oriented unions) as well as the 
intensity of macroeconomic co-ordination‖ (Scheremet, Wolfgang 2000). In some states 
there were ―decentralizing‖ trends in the wage formation process, while in others, a 
centralizing tendency emerged. 
 The problem monetary union creates vis-à-vis wage policy is that wage 
settlements in one state do not necessarily affect ECB policy. The ECB does not change 
its monetary policy according to the asymmetric shock risks some Member States pose. 
Therefore, there is less incentive within each state to achieve ―national wage moderation‖ 
(Dyson, Kenneth H.F. 2008). Instead, there is a ―tragedy of the commons‖ scenario, 
whereby every Member State neglects policies that allow for flexible downward wage 
adjustment because it knows other Member States are doing the same, which ends up 
harming the currency union as a whole. In fact, unit labor costs (ULC‘s) were increasing 
throughout the euro area during the years leading up to the debt crisis (See figures 4.1 
and 4.2).  
Prior to monetary union, a state would compensate for upward wage rigidity and 
maintain short term trade competitiveness through artificial currency devaluation. 
Currently, the relationship between wage policy and monetary policy falls under the 
purview of EMU, which means that states with upward wage rigidity joined the same 
group as countries that placed more value on price stability. Interestingly, ―The mere 
anticipation of such restrictions during the process of European unification led to nominal  
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wage increases in the European countries becoming more closely aligned since the mid-
1980s‖ (Scheremet, Wolfgang 2000). Although inflexible wages are an impediment to 
mitigating the effects of recession and asymmetric shock, generally high wages may not 
be proximate cause of the problem. Felipe and Kumar (2011) argued that reducing wages 
would not yield greater economic performance among the Eurozone‘s economic 
periphery. They found, however, that the highest increases in ULC‘s (wages increasing at 
a faster rate than productivity levels) came from ―Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and 
Italy (in this order)‖ (Felipe, Jesus and Kumar, Utsav 2011). They never explained why 
the five economies with the most significant debt burdens in the Eurozone were also the 
countries with the highest ULC‘s. Nevertheless, Felipe and Kumar (2011) explained that 
there is much more to ULC‘s than meets the eye. They argued that lowering ULC‘s to 
German levels is not necessarily relevant because they produce and export different 
products.  
Germany tends to export much more complex goods such as electronic measuring 
and controlling apparatus, laser, light, and photon beam process machine tools among 
others. Germany‘s export market competes with other developed economies (e.g. US, 
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and Finland) (Felipe, Jesus and Kumar 2011). The 
PIGS countries, however, export much less complex goods than its wealthier Eurozone 
partners. Instead, their export markets are more proximate to China‘s and those of other 
developing economies, which means that peripheral countries could find ways to reduce 
their ULC‘s and would probably remain uncompetitive. Peripheral Member States lag 
behind the stronger economies of the union because ―they are stuck at middle levels of 
technology and they are caught in a trap. Reducing wages would not solve the problem‖ 
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(Felipe, Jesus and Kumar 2011). When taking into account the price deflator of every 
country, with the exception of Greece, every country‘s ULC‘s actually decreased or 
remained constant. Felipe and Kumar (2011) also introduced the idea of unit capital 
costs, which account for expenses incurred by firms outside of labor. They found that 
those costs increased at a faster rate than ULC‘s throughout the euro area.  
Felipe and Kumar (2011) weighed three options they believed were available to 
the economic periphery of the Eurozone. One course of action was austerity and 
structural reforms dedicated to the reduction of ULC‘s and unit capital costs. The second 
option was exiting the euro area altogether and devaluing the national currency to achieve 
greater competitiveness. The third and final option, which they endorsed, was to allow for 
Member States to use more ―active fiscal policy‖ (which they did not elaborate on) and 
combine that with an effort towards upgrading the export market to make it resemble 
Germany‘s (Felipe, Jesus and Kumar 2011).  
Although, the highly indebted countries of the euro area tend to have much higher 
ULC‘s, Felipe and Kumar (2011) presented a valid argument on the deceptiveness of that 
indicator. European institutions place a lot of value on aggregate economic data, but fail 
to account for the nuances that contribute to those statistics. That seemingly inherent 
shortfall of the central bureaucratic apparatus of the Eurozone serves as a reminder that 
maximizing the strength and competitiveness of the Eurozone periphery should remain 
under the purview of national leaders.   
Scheremet (2000) doubted that convergence on inflation rates would be enough to 
ensure a successful monetary union (See figures 5.1 and 5.2). Lack of convergence of 
unemployment could possibly pose a long-term threat on the Eurozone as well. He  
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explained that ―labour markets grow apart in the case of a new negative supply-side 
shock, demands for transfers would surely materialize, and political instabilities could 
appear within monetary union‖ (Scheremet, Wolfgang 2000). He suggested that similar 
labor market flexibility throughout the euro area would eventually lead to convergence of 
unemployment rates.  Scheremet (2000) broadly defined labor market flexibility as 
covering policy areas such as ―taxation, and social insurance systems, labour law, the 
institutional organization of the wage determination process and its ability to adjust to 
cyclical and structural changes‖ (Scheremet, Wolfgang 2000). Treatment for the effects 
of asymmetric shocks would require labor mobility, fiscal policy or relative wage 
flexibility. Diverging structural dynamics pose a greater threat to convergence than 
violation of fiscal rules. Flawed wage and labor structures also aggravate economic 
hardships for countries experiencing recession. 
In an optimum currency area (OCA), countries ―with high divergence in output 
and employment trends need a lot of flexibility in their labour markets if they want to 
form a monetary union, and if they wish to avoid major adjustment problems‖ (de 
Grauwe, Paul 1996). The more divergence of output and employment, the more 
flexibility is necessary in labor markets for the currency union to function. De Grauwe 
(1996) observed that the euro area did not exhibit the features of an OCA. However, 
―there is a subset of EU-countries which form an optimum currency area‖ (de Grauwe, 
Paul 1996). As a result, he recommended a ―two-speed approach‖ to monetary unification 
in which a small group of countries would enter the Eurozone first, while giving other 
countries more time to adjust before joining. Leaders of the Member States, however, 
decided that all prospective members should join simultaneously. Some of the causes for 
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the sovereign debt crisis would reveal the mistake they made in rushing to adopt the euro. 
Moreover, the agreements leading up to EMU did little to solidify the union as an OCA. 
 Optimum currency theory assigns little importance to convergence on inflation 
and budgetary matters. Countries with diverging inflation rates and fiscal policies could 
be less prone to asymmetric shock because of similar economic structures. Conversely, 
states may have similar inflation levels and similar amounts of public spending, but 
experience shocks that are asymmetric because of divergent fiscal and monetary 
structures. For example, if one were to compare Belgium and Germany, one would find 
that,  
Belgium certainly satisfies the inflation convergence criterion. At the same time, however, 
Belgium has a full wage indexing system, whereas Germany does not have one. As a 
result, when an oil price shock occurs [within the Eurozone], the wage price spiral in 
Belgium is likely to lead to competitiveness problems of the Belgian industry (de Grauwe, 
Paul 1996).  
 
The fact that a country was able to control its levels of inflation or public 
expenditures does not mean that it is well equipped to avoid a future asymmetric shock. 
De Grauwe (1996) believed that without ―some degree of centralization of national 
budgets,‖ fiscal constraints would likely do more harm to the union and deprive countries 
of their only viable tool to combat an asymmetric shock. Once again, the rigid fiscal rules 
of the SGP may have done more to hinder economic stability and convergence.  
Garret and Way (1995) explained that countries with unionization in sectors 
exposed to international market competition would be able to adjust well to membership 
in the Eurozone. Those unions were able to exercise wage restraint in the years leading 
up to monetary union because of foreign competition for labor. Countries with strong 
public sector unions, however, may also have had an incentive to join EMU because ―A 
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government might join a fixed exchange rate regime precisely to tie its hands to prevent 
itself from expanding the public economy‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 1995). Garret and Way 
(1995) also explained that states with fiscal imbalances tended to value accession to the 
EU and other transnational European arrangements as a solution to their credibility 
issues. Garret and Way (1995) observed, however, that the European Monetary System 
(EMS) revealed discouraging evidence to the contrary. They were also skeptical about 
the ability of monetary union to rectify those issues in the future.  
Delbecque and Larèche-Révil (2007) found that employment protection 
legislation (EPL) reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) because it ―prevents firms to 
adjust freely to product market condition.‖ They also found no evidence of productivity 
increases resulting from unionization (Delbecque, Vincent  and Larèche-Révil 2007). 
Barell (2008) explained that structural reforms in domestic labor markets are necessary to 
increase FDI and GDP growth. Therefore, insufficient labor market reform contributes to 
the major competitiveness issues peripheral Member States face. 
Duval and Elmeskov (2006) found that while EMU sates were more active in 
their labor and product markets relative to other OECD countries, they lagged behind EU 
states that remained outside of the currency union. Furthermore, they found little 
evidence that such structural reforms had anything to do with membership in the euro 
area because they observed a deceleration in reforming those sectors of their economies 
(Duval, Romain and Elmeskov 2006). One impediment to labor market reform is that the 
economic benefits of such disinflationary and competitiveness-enhancing reforms 
manifest themselves slowly in larger countries (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). 
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Slow manifestation of the positive effects of labor market reforms could also make 
political actors in larger countries more reticent to initiate those reforms. 
Bertola and Boeri (2002) found that economic integration may even aggravate 
unemployment ―or at least make it more urgent for economic agents to exploit all 
margins of flexibility left open by institutions that reduce employment rates.‖ Domestic 
reforms concerning employment and wage formation take time and thus cannot address 
the problem immediately. Furthermore, labor reforms do not point completely in one 
direction. Usually, legislation reducing wage and social benefits for labor may be 
―bundled together with measures compensating specific groups‖ (Bertola, Giuseppe and 
Boeri 2002). In fact, reforms enacted one year are sometimes undone the following year. 
 Although labor reforms progress at a slow and uneven pace, Member States 
should retain autonomy on those policies regardless. If their failure to enact or maintain 
labor reforms creates domestic fiscal problems, the Eurozone should grant Member States 
the same autonomy and flexibility under those circumstances as well while allowing for 
the possibility of default. Federalism is a two-way street. States should be able to benefit 
from policy autonomy, but should internalize the potential failures of those policies as 
well. 
 
   
Economic Risks and Rewards of Monetary Union: 
 
Monetary union reduced exchange rate volatility among states in the euro area 
and reduced volatility for states outside of it as well; Sweden and Denmark being the 
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primary examples, as they have fixed their exchange rates to the euro (Barrell, Ray. 
2008). Faruqee (2004) found that exchange rate certainty moderately contributed to 
increasing trade in within the euro area. EMU contributed to accelerating trade between 
Member States and non-members as well. However, there is wide dispersion with the 
Member States that have benefitted from the trade effects of monetary union. In fact, 
―some countries have been (and remain) better positioned to reap the trade benefits from 
the single currency, and these differences do not appear to be narrowing‖ (Faruqee, 
Hamid 2004). Faruqee (2004) also found that product market reforms and changing trade 
patterns had a greater influence on the trade effects of monetary union than exchange rate 
certainty. 
The UK, however, which continued to pursue an independent monetary policy in 
spite of its close trade relationship with the Eurozone is ―likely to have experienced an 
increase in the volatility of the real effective exchange rate as a result of EMU‖ (Barrell, 
Ray 2008). Viñals and Jimeno (1998) also explained that financial and monetary shocks, 
which were the result of ―imperfectly coordinated national monetary policies, currency 
substitution, and exchange rate movements,‖ would no longer exist under EMU and the 
single monetary policy. 
EMU creates greater price stability by controlling long-term inflation, ―thereby 
exerting a moderating influence on price and wage-setting behaviour‖ (Barrell, Ray 
2008). Furthermore, ―To the extent that the introduction of the euro and the 
implementation of the Single Market Programme removed trade barriers and increased 
transparency, they may have impacted output and productivity growth directly‖ (Barrell, 
Ray 2008). Exchange rate volatility among the geographically proximate states of Europe 
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led to the exchange rate crisis of 1990. Single monetary policy under EMU eliminated 
any future likelihood of such destabilizing exchange rate policy in the euro area (Barrell, 
Ray 2008). 
When comparing the US and EU, Viñals and Jimeno (1998) found that 
―idiosyncratic shocks [tended] to be more frequent in the EU than in the United States.‖ 
They also found that ―shocks are more similar between the US and the subset of EU 
countries that have traditionally maintained closer economic and monetary links with 
Germany‖ (Viñals, Jose and Jimeno, 37). That finding led them to extrapolate that a 
smaller and more integrated EMU would avoid the risks of asymmetric shock, while a 
larger Eurozone would not be able to. That conclusion seemed to favor the de Grauwe 
(1996) prescription for a two-speed approach to union.  
 Barrell (2008) concluded that monetary union had direct effects on output growth 
―and also promotes reductions in output and real effective exchange rate volatility and 
thereby influences the accumulation of productive capital.‖ He also found that EMU has 
had a net positive effect on economic growth and employment. However, since the birth 
of the common currency, economic growth in the euro area lagged behind the US, UK, 
Denmark, and Sweden (Barrell, Ray 2008).  
 De Grauwe (2011) explained that when a country issues debt in a currency it has 
no control over, it becomes more susceptible to default through deflation. When 
bondholders sell their holdings in a Member State‘s debt and use their euros to invest in 
another Member State, one country gains liquidity at the expense of another. 
Consequently, the country losing liquidity risks experiencing deflation. Deflation, in 
addition to high interest rates, makes debt repayment more difficult. When a country has 
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control of its currency, however, bondholders can choose to sell their holdings, but are 
paid in the currency directly issued by the country. As a result, that money would 
inevitably find its way back to the bond issuing country and keep money supply 
unchanged. If the money was not reinvested in the debtor nation, its central bank would 
monetize its debt and avoid default (de Grauwe, Paul 2011). The problem with the de 
Grauwe (2011) argument, however, is that inflation rates converge under monetary union 
and are therefore less likely to be a factor in making debt repayment more difficult for 
certain Member States. 
There are several shortcomings that arise from losing control of monetary policy. 
Eurozone countries lose the ability to reduce the real value of debt through inflation. 
Another limitation of EMU is that although there may be a single central bank issuing the 
currency, there is very little homogenization of banking regulation among the Member 
States. In an environment ―where banking regulation and supervision are also centralised 
and therefore cross-border banking issues are not relevant, fixing the financial system is 
certainly easier‖ (Darvas, Zsolt 2010). 
Mankiw (2010) explained that the Eurozone resembles the American monetary 
union of the 19
th
 century, where the federal government was relatively small and states 
had completely autonomous fiscal policies. The 19
th
 century US currency union worked 
well in spite of the shocks it endured because it had labor mobility; therefore exhibiting 
the characteristics of an OCA. The problem with the euro is that there is little to no labor 
mobility because language and cultural differences among European countries are far 
greater than they ever were among US states (Mankiw, Gregory 2010).  
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Although the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone resembles the crises among 
several US states, the Eurozone crisis has attracted more fear in spite of the fact that 
combined debt in the Eurozone is lower than that of the US federal government—
however, the individual US states have less combined debt than the Eurozone. The Greek 
fiscal situation is also much worse than it is in any of the US states. Fear of widespread 
contagion from Greek default within the Eurozone threatens to destabilize the monetary 
union. European bank holding of peripheral debt could become a source of instability if 
Member States opt for default.  
An additional problem with the Eurozone debt crisis is that the policy response 
among European institutions and leaders has been ambiguous and disorganized. For 
example,  
When the Greek crisis began to intensify in February 2010, the Greek government was 
hesitant about adopting further consolidation measures, and European partners dithered 
over making a loan to Greece and agreeing to IMF involvement (which, by the way, is not 
prohibited by any EU regulation). As the crisis intensified, policymakers started to blame 
‗speculation‘, or suggest ad hoc measures, such as banning certain financial products and 
setting up a European credit rating agency. When policymakers are busy with these kinds 
of redundant activities and provide conflicting signals about their intentions, markets are 
likely to draw the conclusion that policymakers do not have the means to resolve the crisis 
(Darvas, Zsolt 2010). 
 
Krugman (2010) also observed that even though many US states face fiscal 
turmoil as well, residents of those states continue to receive Social Security and Medicare 
checks from the federal government regardless of how much states consolidate their 
budgets. In the Eurozone, however, citizens are dependent on the Member State—not a 
transnational bureaucracy—for social services (Krugman, Paul 2010). US citizens simply 
do not endure the same consequences of their state‘s economic troubles as citizens of 
individual Eurozone countries.  
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The immediacy of Member State fiscal crises, however, also provides a more 
direct market response to bad economic policies and perpetuates the necessity for more 
substantive reform. Blurring market signals by establishing a larger and more active 
central government merely transfers the problem without eliminating it. The US federal 
government currently faces a heavy debt burden due, in large part, to its obligations to 
pay Social Security and Medicare. Transferring any economic and political responsibility 
of fiscal policy to a transnational bureaucratic apparatus does nothing to mitigate the 
problem of excessive debt accumulation. 
 
 
Causes of the Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
 
Matei (2010) explained that the rise in housing prices created rising wages, which 
made real estate more affordable. As a result of higher labor costs, exports became more 
expensive, which fed into large current account deficits in Spain and Ireland. When the 
European sovereign debt crisis started to develop in late 2009, four euro area countries 
became the symbols of Europe‘s fiscal mismanagement: Portugal, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain (colloquially referred to as the ―PIGS‖). Greece was the only Member State that 
spent recklessly and actively distorted and suppressed important macroeconomic data in 
the years leading up to the financial crisis.  
During the years preceding the global recession, Portugal, Spain and Ireland were 
paradigms of the Eurozone‘s success. They were enjoying healthy economic growth, 
relatively disciplined fiscal policies with low deficits (and surpluses in the case of Ireland 
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and Spain). However, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) noted that many seemingly reliable 
indicators of economic health insufficiently explained the economic realities within those 
countries in the years leading up to the financial crisis. The illusion of economic health 
vanished soon after the fall of 2008, and what emerged were the high levels of foreign 
debt they accumulated from current account deficits and household debt (See figures 6.1 
and 6.2). Although the data was available to European officials, they saw the imbalances 
as a positive by-product of convergence. Today, however, ―they came to be considered as 
symptoms of future sovereign insolvency and indicators of the inherent fragility of the 
whole single currency project‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010).  
  Although monetary union may have mitigated the short-term pressures of high 
current account deficits and household debts, inflation targeting was clearly an 
insufficient tool for preventing excessive credit growth in Spain and Ireland (Giavazzi, 
Francesco and Spaventa 2010). Furthermore, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) noted that 
there was little consideration for the distinction between ―productive and unproductive 
purposes of foreign borrowing‖ in the case of the smaller/weaker economies within 
EMU. Heavy foreign borrowing and the GDP growth that accompanied it in the catch-up 
countries of the euro area had to be repaid eventually. The only way to service that debt 
was through the growth of their ―productive capacity of exportable goods and services‖ 
(Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). The force behind of GDP growth in southern 
Europe and Ireland was the expansion of the housing sector, which was an inherently 
non-exportable good. Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) explained that such a distinction 
never made its way to the traditional convergence models describing EMU dynamics. 
  In addition, ―the output of construction in housing services - is a largely non 
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traded good. Selling houses to foreigners would be registered as foreign direct 
investment: but direct investment was a small share of total flows‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco 
and Spaventa 2010). Convergence models also aggregated all goods in a country as 
tradable without considering that some goods may not have the same tradability as others. 
Once they accounted for that distinction, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) found that the 
current account deficit became more significant than the traditional convergence models 
had assumed (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). 
  What compounded the problem of excessive credit growth in a sector of non-
tradable and non-exportable goods was that foreign investors did not withhold capital in 
the face of an increasingly apparent housing bubble. The reason investors continued to 
flood capital was because they were lending to domestic banking institutions that 
executed the loans going towards construction (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). 
Thus investors were unaware of the fact that they were indirectly feeding into the housing 
bubbles in Spain and Ireland. For some reason, current account deficits seemed to have a 
greater effect on the workings of the euro area while remaining irrelevant within the 
individual states of the US.  
  Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) explained that the inability to distinguish 
between traded and non-traded goods was not an adequate explanation for the different 
effect it had in the euro area relative to the US. They found that the reason the current 
account deficit was more significant within EMU than it was in the US was that markets 
differentiated the debts of American states and the debts of Member States of the 
common currency. Investors seemed to be more preoccupied with the location of a 
corporation in Europe than they were with the location of a corporation within the US.  In 
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addition, ―there is far greater personal mobility within the US than within Europe, where 
there are language barriers and administrative obstacles: this by itself reduces the quantity 
of goods and services which are traded in the sense that they are consumed at home by 
non-residents‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). 
Another distinguishing trait Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) observed was that the 
US was a federation, whereas Europe exhibited the characteristics of ―an association of 
fully sovereign states which, even when accepting a common currency, have delegated 
their competences to Union law only in some specific matters: not for the national 
budgets (the Union budget being almost non-existent), not for taxation, not for civil and 
company laws, not for bankruptcy laws‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). Even 
when European laws were applicable, they were bereft of requirements and had yet to 
address the financial services sector, which remained under the purview of national 
governments. Member States seemed to operate more autonomously than American 
states. As a result, ―a common currency, while blurring to some extent the notion of a 
Member State‘s foreign position, is not by itself sufficient to make that notion irrelevant‖ 
(Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). 
Ireland and Spain led the Eurozone in construction investment ―both as a ratio to 
GDP and as a share of total investment,‖ which indicated a dependence on the housing 
industry (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). Ireland and Spain also had significant 
increases in investment and decreased savings rates (See figures 7.1 and 7.2). Portugal 
also experienced a fall in its savings rate ―in spite of a decline in the investment rate.‖9 As 
a result of the housing boom in Ireland and Spain, domestic credit increased. ―Between 
                                                          
9
 Greece‘s savings numbers are still under revision 
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Figure 7.1: Gross Domestic Savings % GDP (AAA Rated Eurozone Countries) 
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Figure 7.2: Gross Domestic Savings % GDP (PIGS Countries) 
Euro area
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
Source: World Bank Statistics 
52 
 
2004 and 2007 loans for housing credit increased by 68 percent in Ireland and by 65 per 
cent, in Spain,‖ which was double the Eurozone average (See figure 8). Foreign 
borrowing was the main source of credit growth ―as domestic banks would tap the 
interbank market and issue commercial paper or bonds (Kelly 2010, Suarez 2010)‖ 
(Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). 
A major contributor to the heavy foreign borrowing within the Eurozone 
periphery was that yields on sovereign debts throughout the entire euro area remained 
low. Leading up to the global financial crisis, there was a perception of low risk and vast 
amounts of global liquidity. Markets also perceived that adoption of the euro would 
improve the growth prospects of the monetary union‘s economic periphery. In addition, 
they also recognized that there was no mechanism within any of the relevant treaties that 
made the no-bailout clause credible. All of those factors contributed to artificially low 
borrowing costs throughout the economic periphery of the monetary union (Arghyrou, 
Michael and Kontonikas 2011). 
Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) claimed that monetary union provided the perfect 
breeding ground for a credit boom in the Eurozone periphery. It eliminated ―currency and 
liquidity risks (and by fostering financial integration), EMU represented a major shock 
for those countries, as even low yield differentials would attract massive capital flows. 
But this is, after all, what the convergence model would predict‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco 
and Spaventa 2010). By setting short-term real bank market interest rates at negative 
levels, ECB monetary policy fueled the real estate bubble in Spain and Ireland; countries 
where real interest rates were much higher prior to adoption of the euro. With the 
adoption of the Euro, interest rates went from 4.5% and 5.5% in Spain and Ireland  
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respectively to under 1% (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). ―Once the housing bubble burst 
and capital inflows to finance current account deficits dried up, very serious economic 
and financial difficulties eventuated‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009).  
Although Spain‘s fiscal house seemed to be in order, the structural deficit was 
increasing. The housing boom distorted tax collection data because ―the incomes 
indirectly generated as a result of the vitality of construction, the strength of job creation, 
the artificially low unemployment rate, the apparent rise in household wealth due to the 
increase in real estate prices, and the parallel consumption boom‖ made economic 
outlook in Spain seem more optimistic than it really was (Suarez, Javier 2010). The 
bursting of the housing bubble put pressure on the fiscal positions of Spain and Ireland—
especially since their tax revenues were heavily dependent on growth in the housing 
sector. With the exception of Cyprus, Spain and Ireland experienced the largest 
percentage drop in tax revenue from 2008 to 2009 (See figure 9). 
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 Due to the boom in the housing industry and growing corporate profits, Ireland was 
able to offer workers higher wages. The domestic boom masked the unemployment 
effects of exceedingly high labor costs and the damage they did to international  
competitiveness. Although part of Ireland‘s fiscal crisis originated in rising spending (as 
a share of GDP) after 2004, the main cause was its precipitous decrease in revenue 
(Honohan, Patrick 2009). Honohan (2009) explained that the drop in tax revenue was a 
result of a tax structure that was overly reliant on ―cyclically sensitive taxes,‖ including 
the ―corporation tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax (in that order). Their share of tax 
revenues peaked to 30% in 2006 until eventually tumbling to 20% at the downturn during 
2008‖ (Honohan, Patrick 2009). Even though corporate taxes were low (12.5% in 2009), 
their attractiveness to foreign firms brought tax revenues to the high levels the Irish 
government enjoyed leading up to the financial crisis.  
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  Under the cover of high corporate tax revenues, the Irish government used the 
appeal of lower income tax rates as a strategy for getting workers to moderate their wage 
demands. The Irish government was able to afford its concessions on income taxes 
because of their increasing revenues from other sources. Although total tax revenue in 
2008 fell by 14%, the revenue decrease from ―cyclically sensitive‖ taxes was even greater 
at 36%. In addition, spending increased 11% in 2007 and 2008 respectively, which 
aggravated the fiscal problems Ireland was starting to experience (Honohan, Patrick 
2009).   
 While the source of Spain and Ireland‘s troubles originated in an overheating of 
the housing industry, construction in Greece and Portugal declined while remaining 
stable throughout the rest of the Eurozone. Excess production of non-tradable goods was 
not a major issue in Greece or Portugal and private investment to GDP was roughly equal 
to the Eurozone average. Greece simply had too much consumption and exorbitant public 
deficits, which culminated in its 10-year sovereign bond notes exceeding interest rates of 
450 basis points
10
, which made its debt unsustainable (Paliouras, Vaileios). Portugal had 
similar issues, but was in worse shape because its economy was stagnant during the first 
several years of monetary union (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa2010.  In order for 
Greece to return to a manageable debt of 60% of GDP (See figures 10.1 and 10.2) in 
twenty years, they would need a surplus of 8.4% of GDP. That ambitious target means 
20-25% of Greek tax revenues would have to go toward paying interest on its debt. The 
only OECD country to maintain a surplus of over 6% over the past 50 years was oil rich 
Norway. ―Even less ambitious targets would require politically unrealistic surpluses‖ 
(Sapir, Andre, Pisani-Ferry and Darvas 2011) 
                                                          
10
 One ―basis point‖ means .01%  
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 Darvas (2011) found that the spillover effect from a ―sustainability-restoring haircut‖ 
on debt of the Eurozone periphery would have a moderate effect on banks and have a 
limited effect on the rest of the economies in the Eurozone. Banks in the Eurozone also 
have relatively little exposure to Irish or Portuguese sovereign debt. Only Spain has both 
heavy bank exposure to sovereign debt and a sovereign debt crisis of its own (Sapir, 
Andre, Pisani-Ferry and Darvas 2011). In addition to the fact that investors became more 
selective about the sovereign bonds they invested in during the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, the lack of a national central bank to ―support the national Treasury as ‗market 
maker of last resort‘‖ left the more aggrieved Eurozone countries economically stranded.  
  Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) observed that while the economic benchmarks of 
the SGP were important, they were superficial and should have contained requirements 
pertaining to ―relative productivity and cost trends; credit and leverage; the savings-
investment balance, and hence the current account, which, though no longer a short-term 
binding constraint under a common currency, is an immediate indicator of the existence 
of output-expenditure imbalances‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco and Spaventa 2010). Inflation 
and interest rate convergence is a much less useful indicator of integration when 
considering that they naturally converge to a great degree under monetary union 
anyway.
11
 Another problem was that the SGP outlined ineffective institutional measures 
to address its fiscal problems. Although there was some convergence in terms of SGP 
benchmarks, there was increasing divergence in the variables Giavazzi and Spaventa 
(2010) mentioned. For example, the ostensible successes in Spanish and Irish 
management of its debts and deficits were mitigated by later developments. They 
                                                          
11
 Figures 5.1 and 5.2 on page 37 confirm that inflation has gradually converged within the euro area, even 
as the debt crisis was unfolding. 
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concluded that ―the stability of the monetary union [must depend] on a wider set of 
conditions than compliance with budgetary discipline‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco and 
Spaventa 2010). 
As a panacea for the deficiencies of the SGP, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) 
suggested imposing a ceiling on domestic credit accumulation. They admitted, however, 
that such a ceiling would be difficult to establish through common monetary policy; 
mainly because it is incapable of dealing with ―divergent credit dynamics within the 
union‖ (Giavazzi, Francesco 2010). Centralizing the union under common economic 
benchmarks is simply too complex. Instead, they suggested creating ―supervisory and 
regulatory powers‖ that impose stricter lending requirements. National regimes were also 
insufficient to curb the excesses that led to the problems Europe experienced after the 
financial crisis. The ECB does not have any of the requisite powers either. Instead, 
Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) had more confidence in the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), which came to existence after the 2009 de Larosière report recommended the 
establishment of a supervisory body to oversee risk in the financial system throughout the 
EU (Eurpean Systemic Risk Board).  
The fiscal crises in southern Europe and Ireland show that not all sovereign debt 
is created equal. While fiscal profligacy ultimately was responsible for the problems in 
Portugal and Greece, more obscure variables contributed to the crises in Ireland and 
Spain. Furthermore, the consensus is that SGP rules did not have enough credibility to 
deter the Greek and Portuguese governments from spending beyond their means. 
Procyclical fiscal policies further fueled the overheating of the housing market and using 
monetary policy as a means of cooling it was out of the question. With different Member 
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States came different economic structures. The one-size-fits-all structure of monetary 
union constrained the ECB from addressing the illicit growth of the housing industry in 
Spain and Ireland.  
  At first glance, the difficulties of a one-size-fits-all monetary policy may lead 
countries to pull out of the arrangement. There is some temptation because independent 
monetary policy would allow for a state to devalue its currency in an effort to boost 
exports or provide for a sovereign bond purchaser to act when government bond auctions 
fail (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). However, the argument for currency devaluation as a 
means of boosting the strength of exports rests on the popular J-curve theory
12
, which has 
little empirical support (Rose, Andrew K. 1989). Moreover, the devaluation that occurs as 
a result of excessive bond purchasing on the part of central banks can undermine price 
stability through inflation. Instead, economically troubled Member States should focus 
more on structural changes in order to become fiscally disciplined and internationally 
competitive. 
  Eichengreen (2009) conceded that there were attractive features to reverting to 
national currencies, but he quickly dismissed such a course of action as unworkable and 
potentially disastrous. First, currency depreciation or support for ―embattled domestic 
producers with concessional loans and subsidies‖ on the part of the exiting country would 
create political tensions within the EU. That development would ―threaten Europe‘s 
signal economic achievement, the creation of a true single market in which producers in 
EU countries compete on an equal footing. More complaints of currency manipulation 
and competitive devaluation would place this achievement at risk‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 
                                                          
12
 The theory that a given country‘s exports become cheaper and consequently more attractive when its 
currency loses value. Therefore, the implication is that trade deficits go down as well. 
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2009).  
  The Lisbon Treaty contained an exit clause allowing withdrawal from the EU, 
but contained no clause allowing for an exit from the euro. ―The implication is that in 
order to quit the euro a country would have to quit the EU, thereby abrogating the entire 
range of treaty obligations to its fellow member states‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). The 
reintroduction of national currencies may even have the opposite effect that national 
governments would desire because bond spreads have risen to higher levels among some 
European countries that are outside of the Eurozone (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009).  
  Eichengreen (2009) found that investors and rating agencies are attracted to 
Member states‘ sovereign bonds because of the rules and sanctions of the SGP. 
Moreover, the no-bailout clause prevented the ECB from purchasing treasury bonds 
directly from national governments (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). In May of 2010, 
however, the ECB initiated its sovereign debt purchase program called the ―Securities 
Market Programme‖ in the Eurozone periphery, which continues to the present day 
(Sapir, Andre, Pisani-Ferry and Darvas 2011).  
  There are other impediments that would persist in the event of a withdrawal the 
euro. Even if ―wages and other incomes [were] redenominated into that national 
currency, it would become necessary to redenominate mortgages and credit-card debts of 
residents as well‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). If not, depreciation of the national 
currency ―would have adverse balance-sheet effects for households, leading to financial 
distress and bankruptcies‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). With the redenomination of 
mortgages and other bank assets, ―bank deposits and other bank balance sheet items 
would have to be redenominated in order to avoid destabilizing the financial sector‖ 
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(Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). The redenomination of government revenues in national 
currency ―not just public-sector wages and pensions but also other government liabilities, 
notably the public debt, would have to be redenominated to prevent balance-sheet effects 
from damaging the government‘s financial position‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). 
Another problem with currency redenomination that would result from 
abandoning the common currency would be that foreign investors could still demand 
compensation in euros under ―continuity of contract provisions.‖ Therefore, leaving the 
Eurozone would not resolve a country‘s sovereign debt problems. If a withdrawing 
country chose to redenominate its debts, it would have less access to international 
financial markets and currency depreciation would increase the price of sovereign debt 
(Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). 
Historically, breakups in monetary unions took place when members ―were 
relatively closed to trade and financial flows and when the banking and financial system 
was underdeveloped or tightly regulated, leaving only limited scope for capital flight 
when preparations were underway‖ (Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). Nitsch (2004) also 
confirmed that currency unions are more likely to break up when members have closed 
economies. Considering that one of the essential characteristics of the euro area is its 
economic openness, EMU does not fit that description.
 
The Nitsch (2004) study also 
found that breakup is more likely when there are large differences in GDP per-capita 
among member states, high inflation differentials, low trade (as a share of GDP). 
Interestingly, differentials in current account balances, symmetry of shocks, or fiscal 
issues have no predictive effect on the survival or failure of currency unions (Nitsch, 
Volker 2004). 
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In light of the Nitsch (2004) findings, greater oversight on the current account 
position of Eurozone countries, as Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) suggested, is no longer 
necessary. Furthermore, additional institutionalization through the ESRB and other 
similar European structures is unnecessary. The Nitsch (2004) findings serve as 
additional confirmation that there is no necessity for increasing centralization and 
bureaucratization of the currency union in order to address some of the economic issues it 
faces. 
Bordo and Jonung (1999) analyzed the survival of monetary unions based on 
whether they exhibited national or transnational characteristics. They found that 
monetary unions that are politically united have distinct outcomes than those that are not. 
Transnational monetary unions were much easier to break up if the states within the 
arrangement retained their central banks during the period of monetary union. They 
concluded that fraying of political unity within the monetary union is ultimately what is 
responsible for the breakup of a monetary union. Economic disagreements remain 
important as well. The US Civil War and the breakup of Czechoslovakia are evidence of 
how diverging economic views caused the breakup of those monetary arrangements.  
The problem with examining EMU is that it has the features of a transnational 
currency union, while retaining other features that make it a politically unified, national 
currency union—even though there is no central fiscal apparatus at the European level. 
Bordo and Jonung (1999) found that EMU had a more proximate resemblance to a 
national currency union because it has a singular monetary authority (the ECB), 
permanent membership, and no escape clauses built into the framework. The essential 
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trait of a national currency union is that political—not economic—considerations are the 
strongest determinants of their creation and their dissolution (Bordo, Michael D. 1999). 
One of the difficulties with evaluating the possible solutions for the issues 
afflicting EMU is adequately defining what kind of a union the euro area is. In one way 
the euro area resembles the loose federation that Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) described. 
However, it also has qualities that resemble a national currency union (e.g. the US). This 
thesis argues that it is somewhat of a hybrid and it accepts that investors do make 
distinctions between European debts and American debts. However, as Bordo and Jonung 
(1999) explained, there are too many features of EMU that resemble a national currency 
union.  
Eichengreen (2009) believed that EMU would either have to go in the direction of 
more centralized control of financial markets within European level institutions ―in a 
manner analogous to the relations between the ECB and euro area national central banks 
or it will have to move backward to the renationalization of its financial markets‖ 
(Eichengreen, Barry J. 2009). After Member States put so much effort into the Euro, 
Eichengreen (2009) envisioned a trend towards greater transnational bureaucratization. 
In light of Eichengreen‘s own analysis on the disastrous effects of withdrawal, he 
may have overlooked the possibility that the necessary corrective measures may actually 
follow from the institutional failures of the Eurozone. If the costs of default within the 
union are outweighed by the costs of defaulting or inflating outside of it, the domestic 
political environment necessary to enact substantive economic reforms would finally 
emerge, whereby highly indebted states could opt for default and ultimately strengthen 
the long term viability of the monetary union.  
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Centralization of EMU policy would be difficult considering that EU budget only 
comprises 1% of European GDP and remains limited to specific policies such as 
―Common Agriculture Policy, the Cohesion Policy, R&D programs, and official 
development assistance‖ (Dabrowski, Marek 2010). However, regulation and supervision 
in financial markets is likely to fall under the legal purview of European institutions 
(Dabrowski, Marek 2010).  
Although some kind of financial market regulation at the European level may be a 
welcome solution, other forms of federalism may serve as a more efficient tool for 
addressing the issues facing several euro area countries in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. Since the rigid economic rules of the Maastricht Treaty and SGP were 
incapable of preventing the fiscal divergence and economic instability that arose after the 
financial crisis, there is no guarantee that more rigid benchmarks are the solution. The 
Maastricht criteria and the SGP were either counterproductive in what they did address or 
deficient in other areas that were economically significant. Instead, loose regulations on 
some policies should replace the stricter numerical benchmarks of the SGP. 
  
 
Institutional Arrangements in Response to the Debt Crisis 
   
The European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) emerged in May of 2010 as 
the primary institutional arrangement to address the sovereign debt crisis. In 2013, it will 
become a permanent body under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will 
serve as an emergency lender to struggling countries within the Eurozone. The source of 
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funding for the EFSM and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) are bonds 
guaranteed by the EU budget and members of the EU. The EFSM is available to all EU 
countries, while funds from the EFSF are limited to Eurozone countries. The loans the 
EFSF can provide is lower than the total amount of money it raises because it uses ―credit 
enhancements to guarantee the triple-A rating of the debt instruments issued by the EFSF.  
Accordingly, the EFSF has to retain a buffer to reassure investors that the states which 
back the debt issuances will honor their obligations‖ (Paliouras, Vaileios). 
Much to the dismay of de Grauwe (2011), the EFSF lent emergency funds to 
Ireland at a 6% interest rate, which made it more difficult for Ireland to reduce its budget 
deficit and signaled to the markets that Ireland remains a significant default risk. The 
dynamic the EFSF created by imposing high interest rates on its rescue package made 
default more likely. De Grauwe (2011) suggested that the ESM should lend at a much 
lower rate in order to slow debt accumulation and create trust in the success of the rescue 
package. Such trust would supposedly assuage markets to the point of mirroring the ESM 
offering loans at lower interest rates as well. 
De Grauwe (2011) was critical of collective actions clauses of the ESM, which 
state that private bondholders would have to accept debt restructuring whenever a 
Eurozone country seeks the assistance of the ESM. The problem with such clauses is that 
it will make bondholders more reticent to purchase sovereign debt and more willing to 
sell it, which would raise interest rates and force the country in question to seek ESM 
help anyway. 
Another feature of the ESM is its imposition of austerity measures for countries 
seeking emergency funding, which would lead to the procyclical fiscal policies de 
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Grauwe (2011) believed countries should avoid. Although he lauded the idea of the ESM, 
de Grauwe (2011) believed that its design would make default more likely. Although he 
is correct in asserting that ESM rules accelerate the march towards default, the idea of the 
program is unsettling as well. The ESM is a Eurocentric recapitulation of other money 
transfer arrangements, meaning that the moral hazard (created by the assurance of outside 
aid) would remain intact. 
The Euro Plus Pact is a less ambitious agreement than its preceding incarnations 
(The ―Pact for Competitiveness‖ and the subsequent ―Pact for the Euro‖). The reason for 
diluting the provisions of the treaty is that proposals to end wage indexation and adoption 
of constitutional measures to rein in debt ―were replaced by language calling for 
discretionary assessment of policies by the Member States‖ (Paliouras, Vaileios). The 
objectives of the agreement include ―[fostering] competitiveness and employment, and to 
increase sustainability of public finances, as well as, to reinforce financial stability‖ (The 
European Council 2011). The Pact sought to lower ULCs, lower taxes on labor, and 
reform the pension system. Those reforms will fall under the purview of national 
governments and ―will be mainly implemented through non-binding policy guidelines‖ 
(Paliouras, Vaileios).  
Looser policy guidelines are a positive development in the Eurozone because they 
allow Member States the flexibility to undertake the necessary policies to reform their 
economies. Under a regime of looser guidelines, Member States either successfully tailor 
their policies to the peculiarities of their economic structures or ultimately assume full 
political ownership of their failures. Fiscal federalism works if Member States endure full 
economic ownership of their decisions as well. 
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Conclusion: 
 
One of the difficulties EMU created for the economic periphery of the union prior 
to the adoption of the euro was that several countries had higher real (bank market) 
interest rates. Once the euro went into circulation, interest rates under the ECB converged 
at levels that were appropriate for an economy such as Germany, but not a Spain or 
Ireland. This problem was a function of certain countries rushing into euro adoption. As a 
result of several countries entering the currency union far too quickly, its members have 
engaged in several bureaucratic and policy measures that are little more than patchwork 
for a poorly designed system that came into existence earlier than it should have. One 
lesson of the debt crisis is that the Eurozone should be more careful in accepting new 
members in order to avoid the problems it currently faces. 
Unlike Eichengreen (2009), Buti (2004) suggested softening of Eurozone rules. 
He observed that abolishing the SGP and letting member states ―return to full political 
ownership of decisions‖ was the most preferable course of action. Even though he 
accepted that ―EU institutions should be allowed to issue recommendations on Member 
States‘ public finances and encouraged to defend these in public discourse,‖ he believed 
that Member States have the right to disagree and provide ―national politics the last word 
in the procedure‖  (Buti, Marco 2004). Buti (2004) went on to insist that no supranational 
rules would be able to create the proper incentives to stabilize national economies and 
avoid ―fiscal free-riding.‖ He suggested that it would be a better idea to abolish the SGP 
altogether and rely on looser Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG‘s) instead. 
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Hallerberg (2010) proposed that market discipline was the best form of dealing 
with excessive Member State debt. He explained that several US states during the 1840s 
faced unsustainable debts, which they accumulated as a result of expensive investment 
projects (e.g. railroads, canals and state banks). Instead of stepping in to help, the federal 
government did nothing as many states defaulted or partially repudiated their debts. In the 
aftermath of the fiscal crises, voters in troubled US states demanded the adoption of fiscal 
rules in their constitutions. ―By 1857, most state constitutions had a balanced budget 
amendment in their constitutions, and today 49 of 50 states have some version of this 
restriction‖ (Hallerberg, Mark 2008).  
The development that emerged in the US during the middle of the 19
th
 century 
seems to be in its nascent stages in the Eurozone with Italian Prime Minister, Silvio 
Berlusconi, promising to introduce a national balanced budget amendment that would 
balance Italy‘s finances by 2013 (Emsden, Christopher and Forelle 2011). The current 
wave of fiscal consolidation is not identical to what occurred in the mid-19
th
 century in 
the US, because much of the current trend is accompanied by some outside institutional 
pressures in addition to the market pressures created by high interest rates. In light of the 
unsustainable economic policies Member States enact under coercion, less institutional 
pressure would yield better results. 
Reform efforts in Member States lose domestic support when outside institutions 
are perceived to be imposing them. Aid intended for repaying unpopular holders of 
sovereign debt (e.g. banks) also creates audience costs when such aid is accompanied by 
austerity measures that reduce benefits for average citizens. Those measures serve to 
weaken the political standing of the union and make the monetary union more fragile as a 
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consequence. Taking taxpayer money from one country to transfer to another in an effort 
to repay large holders of debt creates animosity among citizens of the sender country as 
well. Therefore, leaders in the euro area would benefit from upholding the spirit of the 
no-bailout clauses of its agreements and allow banks to take losses on bad investments in 
the same manner that individuals do. 
To Hallerberg (2008), market forces provide sufficient disciplinary measures 
necessary to stimulate genuine reforms. Those forces mitigate the need for additional 
bureaucratization of the currency union. Hallerberg (2008) welcomed high bond spreads 
because they provided a market-based punishment that essentially rendered the corrective 
arm of the SGP unnecessary. Market forces within EMU should be sufficient to correct 
the fiscal problems of the Eurozone‘s weaker economies.  
Withdrawal from the currency union is unlikely for countries nearing default 
because abandoning the euro would not alleviate any of the debt burdens of the countries 
in question. The only way for those particular Member States to meet their debt 
obligations outside of the Eurozone is through massive money printing in national 
currencies that are already devalued. Risking runaway inflation and losing the privileges 
of EU membership are in no way preferable to debt restructuring within the euro area. 
Moreover, in light of the stress test the European Banking Authority (EBA) conducted in 
March of 2011, claims of widespread bank failure in the event of default exaggerate the 
scope of bank failure that would result within the Eurozone. Only 8 of the 90 banks that 
the study examined would fall short of the minimum capital requirement to stay afloat in 
the event of an economic contraction lasting two years. Additionally, most of the 
holdings in sovereign debt are held domestically (European Banking Authority 2011). 
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Any major widespread contagion of a Member State‘s default is certainly possible, but 
unlikely in the Eurozone.  
Although the SGP‘s benchmarks and corrective framework were ineffective, its 
policy guidelines were constructive. Therefore loose BEPG‘s should replace any strict 
conditionality. EMU can still enjoy long-term success if its leaders decide to accept the 
short-term pain that would result from defaults and fiscal reforms of its structurally 
unsound economies. Although, the solution seems harsh, the Eurozone‘s economic bad 
actors have such a high disincentive to withdraw from the union that they would 
eventually enact the structural reforms necessary to ensure the viability and sustainability 
of their economies and the euro area as a whole. With the development of the ESM loan 
program and some variation of the increasingly popular Eurobond proposal, the 
Eichengreen (2009) prediction of greater centralization seems to be more likely. 
However, such a development may mask structural issues within individual member 
states and probably weaken the arrangement politically or economically.  
Eurobonds or any measures to bureaucratize and centralize the monetary union 
are attempts to blur the signals that markets inevitably deliver. They treat the symptom of 
bad economic structures and fiscal mismanagement among the Eurozone periphery by 
pooling the risk of sovereign debt, but they do not resolve the underlying issues. BEPG‘s 
that allow for varying forms of labor and wage reforms are a step in the right direction. 
However, in light of the Felipe and Kumar (2011) analysis, peripheral Member States 
should find ways to produce and export more sophisticated goods in order to avoid wage 
competition with developing countries. 
71 
 
The only exception to the federalist solution pertains to the financial sector. If 
there is a large central bank issuing the currency for all 17 countries, then it should also 
be responsible for homogenizing banking and financial services regulation as well. 
Considering that low ECB interest rates led to excessive liquidity in Ireland and Spain, 
the Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) proposal for some supervision on lending standards at 
the European level would also be constructive, but admittedly difficult to implement. 
There is no guarantee that countries will end their fiscal profligacy under the 
common Eurobond framework. If a Member State eclipses the 60% of debt to GDP 
threshold and decides to issue Red bonds at higher interest rates, will they really have to 
repay it? Will they be able to pass the cost to the rest of the union by creating a systemic 
risk with the threat of default? Peripheral Eurozone countries may use the appeal of 
common Eurobonds to avoid the political backlash of undergoing fiscal consolidation. 
However, the prospective reward of Eurozone membership over a decade ago failed to 
have that effect.  
Unless the threat of default forces countries to restructure their economies prior to 
joining the Eurobond framework, any form of a Eurobond will likely suffer the same 
credibility issues as the SGP. Consequently, the Eurobond may postpone the day of 
reckoning, but will ultimately be unable to force anything more than cosmetic and 
unsustainable policy changes. Leaders in the Eurozone core have already rejected the 
Eurobond proposal on the grounds that such pooling of debt would require a level of 
fiscal policy integration that does not yet exist within the union (Hollinger, Peggy 2011). 
However, the opinion of German and French leaders is subject to change because 
circumstances and the individuals in power are subject change as well. The problem with 
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homogenizing fiscal policy is that it would be way too big an endeavor for a central 
apparatus to embark on without large scale popular support and the ability to ―exploit 
local information and deal with the large informational asymmetries‖ that is exceedingly 
difficult, if not impossible, at the transnational level (Boeri, Tito 2005).  
The core economies of the euro area will likely accept the Eurobond after they 
decide that they cannot politically sustain the perceived costs of bank failures or money 
transfers in the form of low interest loans. They will probably support the Eurobond, 
however, with excessive conditionality that will stifle the necessary and beneficial 
attributes of fiscal federalism. In the end, the Eurobond and other measures toward 
institutional centralization would likely suffer the same fate as the SGP and bring about 
another crisis the next time the global economy experiences another major setback. 
However, if Member States have the ability to enact reforms under a more flexible 
arrangement, without the implicit or explicit guarantee of outside emergency aid, the 
Eurozone will flourish as the political and economic success its founders envisioned. 
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